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John Y. Campbell, Joa ˜o F. Cocco, Francisco J. Gomes,
and Pascal J. Maenhout
During the past few decades, American households have begun to display
increasing ﬁnancial sophistication and awareness of rates of return on al-
ternative investments. At the same time, the implicit rate of return on con-
tributions to the social security system has declined as the system has
matured, and this rate of return is projected to decline further in the
twenty-ﬁrst century in response to unfavorable demographic trends (Gea-
nakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes 1999). Not surprisingly, politicians and the
public have become interested in the possibility of moving to a privatized
system in which retirement contributions earn market-based rates of
return.
Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to compare alternative retire-
ment systems. Three important issues aﬀect the comparison and invalidate
simple rate-of-return calculations. First, the return on the current system
is low in part because of the overhang of unfunded liabilities. Past genera-
tions have received a gift that must be paid oﬀ before the economy can
enjoy the steady-state beneﬁts of any new system. Second, capital income
taxation puts a wedge between pretax and after-tax rates of return. Wel-
fare calculations should take account of the tax revenue generated by capi-
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439tal accumulation (in some systems, this tax revenue is forgiven, and private
retirement accounts earn higher pretax rates of return). Third, returns
on alternative ﬁnancial assets can diﬀer if these assets have diﬀerent risk
characteristics. A valid comparison of rates of return must adjust for risk.
This paper focuses on the last issue, the evaluation of alternative invest-
ments with diﬀerent risk characteristics. From the point of view of house-
holds, the current social security system represents a deﬁned-beneﬁt pen-
sion plan in which income realizations through life are tied to annuity
payments in retirement. This is similar to a system in which households
are forced to accumulate a riskless asset in a retirement-savings account.
Some commentators have recently argued that households would be
better oﬀ if their retirement savings were invested in risky assets such as
equities that have a higher average return. This could be achieved within
the present system if the social security trust funds were invested in equi-
ties; alternatively, within a privatized system, household retirement ac-
counts could include equity investments.
If a household can borrow to invest in equities, however, then the accu-
mulation of riskless assets within a social security account need not re-
strict the household’s overall portfolio. The household can undo riskless
social security accumulation by borrowing outside the retirement account;
the household’s overall portfolio can be made just as risky as if the retire-
ment account itself were invested in equities. Thus, any claimed beneﬁts
for a change in the social security system must depend on the presence of
portfolio constraints that prevent this sort of asset transformation.
Two diﬀerent sorts of constraints are potentially relevant. First, a house-
hold may be unable to borrow at the riskless interest rate to ﬁnance equity
investments (Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra 1998). Second, a
household may face ﬁxed costs of equity market participation; if these
ﬁxed costs exceed the beneﬁt of participation, the household may hold no
equities (Abel 1998). These constraints may aﬀect diﬀerent households
diﬀerently. The ﬁrst constraint is particularly likely to bind on a household
whose unconstrained optimal equity position is particularly large, while
the second constraint is particularly likely to bind on a poor household
with little total wealth. These diﬀerent sorts of households may be diﬀer-
entially aﬀected by a social security reform that alters portfolio con-
straints.
Clear understanding of these issues requires a well-developed normative
theory of optimal portfolio choice over the life cycle. Until very recently,
however, theoretical work on this subject lagged far behind the familiar
theory of single-period optimal portfolio choice. Samuelson (1969) and
Merton (1969, 1971) showed that there are conditions under which long-
lived investors choose the same portfolios as single-period investors so
that the investment horizon is irrelevant; unfortunately, these conditions
are highly restrictive in that they include power utility, returns on safe and
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over time, and, most disturbing of all, the absence of labor income.
In the last few years, economists have returned to this topic and have
begun to explore long-run portfolio choice when these restrictions are re-
laxed. Ross (1999) shows how horizon eﬀects can emerge from more gen-
eral models of preferences. Brennan and Xia (1998), Campbell and Viceira
(in press), and Wachter (1998b) consider changes over time in the riskless
real interest rate, while Balduzzi and Lynch (1999), Barberis (2000),
Brandt (1999), Campbell and Viceira (1999), Kim and Omberg (1996),
Samuelson (1991), and Wachter (1998a) consider changes over time in the
equity premium, and Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997) and Liu
(1998) allow a more complex pattern of variation in both the real interest
rate and the equity premium. The eﬀect of labor income on portfolio
choice has been explored by Bertaut and Haliassos (1997), Bodie, Merton,
and Samuelson (1991), Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (CGM) (1998),
Gakidis (1997), Heaton and Lucas (1997), Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (1998), and Viceira (in press), among others.
In this paper, we concentrate on the eﬀect of labor income. The theoret-
ical literature on this subject can be loosely summarized as follows. A
household with labor income has an implicit holding of a nontradable
asset, human capital, that represents a claim to the stream of future labor
income. This nontradable asset can “crowd out” explicit asset holdings. If
labor income is literally riskless, then riskless asset holdings are strongly
crowded out, and the household will tilt its portfolio strongly toward risky
assets (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson 1991). If the household is con-
strained from borrowing to ﬁnance risky investments, the solution may be
a corner at which the portfolio is 100 percent risky assets. If labor income
is risky but uncorrelated with risky ﬁnancial assets, then riskless asset
holdings are still crowded out, but less strongly; the portfolio tilt toward
risky assets is reduced (Viceira, in press). If labor income is positively cor-
related with risky ﬁnancial assets, then risky assets can actually be crowded
out, tilting the portfolio toward safe ﬁnancial assets.
Under the assumption that income shocks are uncorrelated or only
weakly correlated with stock returns, these results suggest that households
that expect high future labor income—discounted at some appropriate
rate and measured relative to ﬁnancial wealth—should have the strongest
desire to hold stocks. In a life-cycle model with a realistic age proﬁle of
income, the discounted value of expected future income increases relative
to ﬁnancial wealth in the very early part of adulthood but peaks fairly
early and then declines as workers approach retirement. This suggests that
fairly young (but not the very youngest) households are the most likely to
be aﬀected by borrowing constraints that limit their equity positions.
While empirical evidence on household portfolio allocation is fragmen-
tary, a few recent empirical papers have found that, over the life cycle,
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 441household portfolios have hump-shaped equity positions and U-shaped
positions in safe assets, consistent with the message of the theoretical liter-
ature (Bertaut and Haliassos 1997; Heaton and Lucas 2000; Poterba and
Samwick 1997).
A complicating factor is that many households, particularly younger
and poorer ones, appear to hold no equities at all. This is inconsistent
with simple frictionless models of optimal portfolio choice but may be
explained if there is a ﬁxed cost of participating in equity markets. Such a
ﬁxed cost would deter young households from buying equities, but, later
in the life cycle, these households might ﬁnd it worthwhile to begin partici-
pating if their wealth levels are high enough to justify paying the cost.
In this paper, we explore the quantitative importance of these eﬀects by
solving a calibrated life-cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice
with labor income uncertainty. The model is set in partial equilibrium and
takes as given the stochastic properties of income and asset returns. We
closely follow CGM (1998) but augment their model to allow us to explore
alternative retirement-savings systems and ﬁxed costs of equity market
participation.
We also ask whether heterogeneity across households is likely to have a
large eﬀect on optimal investment patterns. This issue is important for the
debate over social security privatization. A privatized system can allow
greater individual choice over the investment of retirement wealth, but op-
ponents argue that some individuals may fail to invest optimally and that
privatization may increase administrative costs. Whatever the merits of
these arguments, it is important to understand the potential gains from
individual choice in the absence of administrative costs and optimization
failures. To explore this issue, we compare the labor income risk of individ-
uals working in diﬀerent sectors of the economy and study the sensitivity
of optimal choices to diﬀerences in the rate of time preference and the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 11.1 lays out our
life-cyclemodelandcalibratestheparameters.Section11.2presentsbench-
mark results in graphic form. Section 11.3 explores heterogeneity across
households. Section 11.4 conducts a welfare analysis, and section 11.5
concludes.
11.1 A Life-Cycle Model of Portfolio Choice
11.1.1 Model Speciﬁcation
Time Parameters and Preferences
We let t denote adult age. The investor is adult for a maximum of T
periods, of which he works the ﬁrst K. For simplicity, K is assumed to be
exogenous and deterministic. We allow for uncertain life span in the man-
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that the investor is alive at date t  1, conditional on being alive at date t.





























where Cit is the level of date t consumption, 0 is the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion, and 1 is the discount factor. We assume that the
individual derives no utility from leaving a bequest.
The Labor Income Process
Investor i’s age t labor income, Yit, is exogenously given by
(2) for  log( ) ( , ) , Yf t Zv t K it it it it =+ + ≤ ε
wheref(t,Zit)isadeterministicfunctionofageandotherindividualcharac-
teristics Zit, εit is an idiosyncratic temporary shock distributed as N(0,2
ε),
and vit is given by
(3) vv u it i t it =+ − , , 1
where uit is distributed as N(0, 2
u) and is uncorrelated with εit. Thus, log
income is the sum of a deterministic component that can be calibrated to
capture the hump shape of earnings over the life cycle and two random
components, one permanent and one transitory. We assume that the tem-
porary shock εit is uncorrelated across households, but we decompose the
permanent shock uit into an aggregate component (t and an idiosyncratic
component it, uncorrelated across households:
(4) uit t it =+ ξ  .
This decomposition implies that the random component of aggregate
labor income follows a random walk, an assumption made by Fama and
Schwert (1977) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996). While macroeco-
nomists such as Campbell (1996), Campbell and Mankiw (1989), and
Pischke (1995) have found empirical evidence for short-term persistence
in aggregate quarterly labor income growth, the simpliﬁcation to a ran-
dom walk should have little eﬀect on optimal consumption and portfolio
choice over the life cycle.
Financial Assets
We assume that there are two assets in which the agent can invest: a
riskless asset with gross real return Rf, which we call Treasury bills, and a
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 443risky asset with gross real return Rt, which we call stocks. The excess return
on the risky asset, Rt1  Rf,i sg i v e nb y
(5) RR tf t ++ −= + 11 	 ,
where t1, the period t  1 innovation to excess returns, is assumed to be
i.i.d. over time and distributed as N(0,2
). We allow innovations to excess
returns to be correlated with innovations to the aggregate component of
permanent labor income, and we write the correlation coeﬃcient as (.
We also allow for ﬁxed costs of equity market participation: to have access
to the stock market, the investor must pay a one-time monetary ﬁxed cost
equal to F.
Retirement and Liquid Wealth
We model a system of mandatory saving for retirement in the following
simple way. During working life, the individual must save a fraction, ,o f
current labor income as retirement wealth. Under this assumption, dispos-
able labor income, Yd
it,i sg i v e nb y
(6) for  YY t K it
d
it =− ≤ () . 1 
The amount Yit is added to retirement wealth, denoted by WR
it. During
working life, retirement wealth is illiquid; the individual cannot consume
it or borrow against it. At age K, retirement wealth is rolled into a riskless
annuity so that the individual receives in each of the retirement years the
annuity value corresponding to WR
iK. This assumption of riskless annuiti-
zation aﬀects the portfolio choices of older investors. An interesting exten-
sion of our work would be to allow investors to choose between riskless
and variable annuities.
We consider several alternative systems governing the investment of re-
tirement wealth during working life. In the ﬁrst system, the individual is




it is the dollar amount of retirement wealth that investor i
has in riskless assets. In alternative systems, retirement wealth is partially
or fully invested in risky assets, but the allocation remains constant over
time and is not controlled by the investor. We interpret this as the Social
Security Administration managing the individual’s retirement account.
For this reason, the ﬁxed cost of investing in stocks applies only to invest-
ments outside the retirement account.
Investors also have liquid wealth outside their retirement accounts. We
denote liquid wealth of investor i at date t by WL
it and liquid holdings of
bills and stocks by BL
it and SL
it, respectively. We assume that the investor
faces the following borrowing and short-sales constraints:
(7) B it
L ≥ 0,
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L ≥ 0.
The borrowing constraint (7) ensures that the investor’s allocation to bills
in both the liquid and the retirement accounts is nonnegative at all dates.
It prevents the investor from borrowing against future labor income or
retirement wealth. The short-sales constraint (8) ensures that the investor’s
allocation to equities is nonnegative at all dates.
The Household’s Optimization Problem
In each period of a household’s working life (t  K), the timing of
events is as follows. The investor starts the period with liquid wealth WL
it
and retirement wealth WR
it. Then labor income Yit is realized. Following
Deaton (1991), we denote cash on hand in period t by
(9) XW Y it it
L
it =+ − () . 1 
The investor must decide how much to consume, Cit, whether to pay the
ﬁxed cost of entering the stock market (if he has not done so before), and
how to allocate the remaining cash on hand between stocks and bills. We
denote the proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks by L
it. The pro-
portion of retirement wealth invested in stocks, R
it, is given exogenously
by the retirement system and does not vary over time, so R
it  R
i for all
t. We consider diﬀerent values for R
i .
Next-period liquid wealth and retirement wealth are then given by
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where fit is a binary variable that equals zero until the investor pays the
ﬁxed cost of entering the stock market and equals one thereafter, and
Rj
p,i,t1 is the return on the portfolio held from period t to period t  1:
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Here, L
it is freely chosen when fit  1 and equals zero when fit  0.
After retirement (t  K), the problem takes the same form except that
retirement wealth no longer accumulates. Instead, it is annuitized and pro-
vides riskless income A(WR
iK). After-tax labor income (1 )Yit in (9) and
(10) is replaced by A(WR
iK).
The problem that the investor faces is to maximize (1) subject to the
working-life and retirement versions of (2)–(12) plus the constraints that
consumption must be nonnegative at all dates. The control variables of
the problem are {Ct, L
it, fit}T
t1. The state variables are {t, Xit, WR
it, vit,
fi,t1}T
t1. The problem is to solve for the policy rules as a function of the
state variables, that is, Cit(Xit, WR
it, vit, fi,t1), L
it(Xit, WR
it, vit, fi,t1), and
fit(Xit, WR
it, vit, fi,t1).
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This problem cannot be solved analytically. We derive the policy func-
tions numerically by discretizing the state space and the variables over
which the choices are made and by using Gaussian quadrature to approxi-
mate the distributions of the innovations to the labor income process and
risky asset returns (Tauchen and Hussey 1991). The problem is then
solved by using backward induction. In period T, the investor consumes
all his wealth, and the value function coincides with the instantaneous
utility. In every period t prior to T, and for each admissible combination
of the state variables, we compute the value associated with each level of
consumption, decision to pay the ﬁxed cost of entering the stock market,
and share of liquid wealth invested in stocks. This value is equal to current
utility plus the expected discounted continuation value. To compute this
continuation value for points that do not lie on the grid, we use cubic
spline interpolation. The combinations of the choice variables ruled out
by the constraints of the problem are given a very large (negative) utility
such that they are never optimal. We optimize over the diﬀerent choices
using grid search.
When the ﬁxed cost of equity market participation F is equal to zero,
we simplify the solution by exploiting the scale independence of the max-
imization problem and rewriting all variables as ratios to the permanent
component of labor income.
11.1.2 Calibration
Time Parameters and Preferences
Adult age starts at age twenty for households without a college degree
and at age twenty-two for households with a college degree. The age of
retirement is set to sixty-ﬁve for all households. The investor dies with
probability one at age one hundred. Prior to this age, we use the mortality
tables of the National Center for Health Statistics to parameterize the
conditional survival probabilities, pj for j  1 ,...,T. We set the discount
factor  to 0.96 and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion  to 5. In
variations of the benchmark case, we also consider investors who are ex-
tremely impatient with 0.80, comparatively risk tolerant with 2,
and extremely risk averse with 10.
The Labor Income Process
To estimate the labor income process, we follow CGM (1998). Here, we
brieﬂy describe the data and estimation method.
We use the family questionnaire of the Panel Study on Income Dynam-
ics (PSID) to estimate equations (2) and (3), which give labor income as
a function of age and other characteristics. Families that are part of the
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random sample. Only households with a male head are used as the age
proﬁle of income may diﬀer across male- and female-headed households
and relatively few observations are available for female-headed house-
holds. Retirees, nonrespondents, students, homemakers, and household
heads younger than twenty (twenty-two for college-educated households)
or older than sixty-ﬁve are also eliminated from the sample.
Like CGM (1998) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1998, 1999),
we take a broad deﬁnition of labor income so as implicitly to allow for
insurance mechanisms—other than asset accumulation—that households
use to protect themselves against pure labor income risk. Such insurance
mechanisms include welfare programs that eﬀectively set a lower bound
on the support of nonasset income, endogenous variation in the labor
supply of both male and female household members, ﬁnancial help from
relatives and friends, and so on. Thus, we deﬁne labor income as total re-
ported labor income plus unemployment compensation, workers’ com-
pensation, social security, supplemental social security, other welfare,
child support, and total transfers (mainly help from relatives), all this for
both head of household and, if present, his spouse. Observations that still
report zero for this broad income category are dropped. Labor income
deﬁned this way is deﬂated using the consumer price index, with 1992 as
the base year. The sample starts in 1970, so a household appears at most
twenty-four times in the sample. Households with fewer observations are
retained in the panel.
The estimation controls for family-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. To control for
education, the sample is split into three groups: households without high
school education, a second group with high school education but without
a college degree, and, ﬁnally, college graduates. This sample split is in-
tended to accommodate the well-established ﬁnding that age proﬁles diﬀer
in shape across education groups (Attanasio 1995; Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes 1994). For each education group, the function f(t, Zit) is assumed
to be additively separable in t and Zit. The vector Zit of personal character-
istics, other than age and the ﬁxed household eﬀect, includes marital status
and household composition. Household composition equals the addi-
tional number of family members in the household besides the head and,
if present, his spouse.
Ideally, one should also control for occupation. Using PSID data, this
is problematic because, from the 1975 wave onward, the majority of the
unemployed report no occupation and are categorized together with
people who are not in the labor force. But modeling unemployment as a
switch in occupation is inappropriate as the possibility of unemployment
through layoﬀ is one of the main sources of labor income risk. We explore
this in greater detail in section 11.3 below.
To obtain age proﬁles suitable for the simulation model of life-cycle
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 447portfolio choice, we ﬁt a third-order polynomial to the age dummies esti-
mated from the PSID. The resulting income proﬁles are similar to those
used in Attanasio (1995), Carroll and Summers (1991), and Gourinchas
and Parker (1996). They are plotted in ﬁgure 11.1, along with the under-
lying age dummies for each of the three education groups.
To estimate the variances of permanent and temporary shocks to labor
income, we follow Carroll and Samwick (1997). Deﬁning Y* it as
(13) log( *) log( ) ˆ(, ) , YY f t Z it it it ≡−
then




ε by running an OLS regression of var[log(Y* i,td) 
log(Y* it )]ond and a constant term. We ﬁnd that groups with less educa-
tion tend to have more variable transitory income shocks but less variable
permanent shocks than groups with more education. Table 11.1 reports
these variances.
448 J. Y. Campbell, J. F. Cocco, F. J. Gomes, and P. J. Maenhout
Fig. 11.1 Labor income proﬁles (age dummies and ﬁtted polynomials)
Note: The solid line gives the underlying age dummies, the dotted line a third-order polyno-
mial ﬁtted to these age dummies.We use a similar procedure to estimate the correlation between labor
income shocks and stock returns, (. The change in log(Y* it) can be writ-
ten as
(15)   log( *). , Y it t it it i t =+ +− − ξ  εε 1
Averaging across individuals gives
(16)  log( *). Y it t =ξ
The correlation coeﬃcient is then easily computed from the OLS regres-
sion of  log(Y* it ) on demeaned excess returns:
(17)   log( *)( ) . YR R it t f t =− − + + 	  1
As an empirical measure for the excess return on our stylized risky asset,
we use CRSP (Center for Research in Securities Prices) data on the New
York Stock Exchange value-weighted stock return relative to the Treasury-
Table 11.1 Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Retirement age (K)6 5
Discount factor () .96
Risk aversion ()5
Variance of transitory shocks (2
ε):
No high school .1056
High school .0738
College .0584
Variance of permanent shocks (2
u):
No high school .0105
High school .0106
College .0169
Sensitivity to stock returns ():
No high school .0956
High school .0627
College .0733
Correlation with stock returns (():
No high school .3280
High school .3709
College .5155
Riskless rate (RF  1) .02
Mean excess return on stocks (	) .04
Standard stock return () .157
Fixed cost (F) 0 or 10,000
Social security tax rate () .10
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 449bill rate. For all education groups, the regression coeﬃcients are strikingly
low and insigniﬁcant. To allow for potential lags in the realization of labor
income, we repeat the exercise with the excess stock return lagged one
year. The relation becomes much stronger: the regression coeﬃcient now
varies from 0.06 to 0.10 and the correlation coeﬃcient from 0.32 to 0.52,
as reported in table 11.1. Interestingly, the correlation of labor income
with the stock market is larger and more signiﬁcant for households with
higher education.1
In our portfolio-choice model, allowing for lags in the relation between
innovations in stock returns and permanent shocks to labor income unfor-
tunately requires an additional state variable. We therefore assume that
the correlation is contemporaneous. The model requires the variances of
both (t, the aggregate permanent labor income shock that is correlated
with stock market risk, and it, the idiosyncratic permanent shock to labor
income. The ﬁrst variance is obtained immediately as the variance of
 log(Y* it ). Subtracting this variance from the total variance of uit gives
then the variance of it.
Other Parameters
The riskless real interest rate is assumed to be constant at 2 percent. We
set the equity premium 	 equal to 4 percent. This is well below the long-
run historical average but represents a reasonable compromise between
that average and lower forward-looking estimates based on the observa-
tion that stock prices have tended to increase in recent years relative to
corporate earnings (Blanchard 1993; Campbell and Shiller 1998). We set
the standard deviation of innovations to the risky asset  to 0.157. Recall
that the classic formula for the risky-asset portfolio share, under power
utility with i.i.d. returns and no labor income, is 	/2
. With these param-
eters, the implied risky asset share would be about one-third at the bench-
mark risk aversion of 5; we ﬁnd higher optimal shares in our model only
because of the presence of labor income. We set the ﬁxed cost of equity
market participation to zero in the benchmark case, but we go on to con-
sider a $10,000 ﬁxed cost.
The proportion of labor income  that is added to retirement wealth is
equal to 10 percent of current labor income when retirement wealth ac-
cumulates at the riskless rate. This value implies an average replacement
ratio at age sixty-ﬁve of 60 percent. When retirement wealth is also in-
vested in stocks, we either ﬁx  at the same 10 percent value or adjust it
so as to maintain the replacement ratio at 60 percent. We will show that
the value of  has a very important eﬀect on our results. Table 11.1 sum-
marizes the parameters used in the baseline case.
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1. We also examined the relation of labor income shocks with lagged returns on long-term
government bonds. These results are reported in sec. 11.3 below.11.2 Benchmark Results: A Graphic Summary
The ﬁrst comparison that we consider is between a system with riskless
retirement accumulation (R  0) and one in which at each age half of
retirement wealth is invested in stocks (R  .5). In the latter system, we
reduce the social security tax rate from 10 to 6 percent so that, on average,
the replacement ratio is the same in both systems and equal to 0.6. At
retirement, the account is annuitized at the riskless interest rate so that,
on average, and given survival probabilities, the system has zero balance.
To study the behavior of the variables in the model, we calculate cross-
sectional averages across ten thousand households receiving diﬀerent
draws of income and asset returns and plot them against age. Figure 11.2
plots labor income net of social security contributions, consumption, liq-
uid wealth, and retirement wealth for households with a high school de-
gree (the life-cycle patterns for other education groups are similar). Figure
11.2A illustrates the system in which retirement wealth is fully invested in
the riskless asset, and ﬁgure 11.2B illustrates the system in which retire-
ment wealth is partially invested in stocks.
In both systems, the average consumer is borrowing constrained early
in life. Consumption tracks net income very closely, and little savings accu-
mulate outside the retirement account until after age forty. These limited
savings early in life are driven by the precautionary savings motive; thus,
like Gourinchas and Parker (1996), we ﬁnd that younger consumers are
buﬀer-stock savers rather than life-cycle savers in the classic sense. Con-
sumption rises with income early in life because of borrowing constraints
and falls later as increased mortality drives up the eﬀective rate of time
preference; thus, consumption proﬁles are hump shaped over life, as found
in the literature on life-cycle consumption behavior.2
Investment of some retirement wealth in stocks has an income eﬀect.
Because the average return on stocks is higher than the average return on
bills, and because younger consumers have neither the desire nor the liquid
wealth to oﬀset a shift of retirement wealth into stocks, the shift increases
average lifetime resources. Since we reduce the social security tax rate to
keep the average replacement ratio constant across systems, the invest-
ment of retirement wealth in stocks frees up resources in the working
years. These additional resources are consumed early in life since, at this
stage, households are borrowing constrained.
Of course, the investment of retirement wealth in stocks has a cost: it
imposes additional risk on households. In midlife, households react by
increasing their precautionary saving, accumulating more liquid wealth,
and consuming less relative to income. After retirement, the additional
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2. We could generate a more pronounced hump shape in consumption if we added age-
speciﬁc preference shocks to the model.wealth is run down since, at this stage, retirement wealth is rolled into a
riskless annuity. These patterns show up in the paths of consumption rela-
tive to income in ﬁgure 11.2.
Figure 11.3 plots liquid wealth and liquid holdings of equities and bills
over the life cycle. In each retirement system, the borrowing constraint
binds for young households; they would like to take more equity risk but
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Fig. 11.2 Consumption, income, wealth, and annuity: A, Retirement wealth fully
invested in the safe asset; B, Retirement wealth invested 50/50 in risky/safe asset
A
Bare unable to do so. For approximately the ﬁrst twenty years of life, they
hold 100 percent of their portfolios in the form of equity. Households in
midlife hold bills, but these holdings decrease again after retirement.
Figure 11.4 plots the portfolio share of stocks in liquid wealth. The
crucial variables for portfolio composition are liquid wealth, retirement
wealth, and future labor income. In the model, although future labor
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B
Fig. 11.3 Wealth, stocks, and Treasury bills: A, Retirement wealth fully invested
in the safe asset; B, Retirement wealth invested 50/50 in risky/safe assetA
B
Fig. 11.4 Liquid portfolio share invested in stocks: A, Retirement wealth fully
invested in the safe asset; B, Retirement wealth invested 50/50 in risky/safe assetincome is risky, it can be thought of as implicit holdings of a riskless asset.
Innovations to labor income are positively correlated with innovations to
stock returns, but this correlation is not suﬃciently large for future labor
income to resemble more closely stocks than bills. Since early in life the
implicit holdings of the riskless asset in the form of future labor income
are large, the investor wishes to invest what little liquid wealth he has fully
into stocks. From age forty on, liquid wealth increases relative to future
labor income and retirement wealth so that implicit holdings of the risk-
less asset become less important. This induces a shift in the composition
of liquid wealth toward bills. After retirement, liquid wealth is run down
more rapidly than the implicit annuitized holdings of the riskless asset. As
this happens, the implicit holdings of the riskless asset become relatively
more important, inducing a shift in portfolio composition back toward
stocks.
These considerations explain the life-cycle patterns in both ﬁgure 11.4A
and ﬁgure 11.4B. There are, however, important diﬀerences in magnitudes
between the two ﬁgures. In ﬁgure 11.4B, the midlife decrease in the share
invested in stocks is much more dramatic. Since the investor already holds
risky assets in the retirement account, he wishes to hold a safer liquid port-
folio.
Another way to understand these results is to compare the patterns of
current utility of consumption over the life cycle. Figure 11.5A shows the
ratio of average current utility for households in the 50/50 system to the
average current utility of households in the 100/0 system. We see that most
of the gain from investing retirement wealth in stocks occurs early in life.
The source of this gain is the higher levels of consumption that a lower
social security contribution allows. Return risk in the retirement account
allows some households to end up poorer so that, after age ﬁfty-ﬁve, cur-
rent utility is on average higher in the 100/0 system.
Return risk also increases the dispersion of utility. The standard devia-
tions of current utility across households with diﬀerent income and return
realizations are higher in the 50/50 system than in the 100/0 system. Fig-
ure 11.5B reports the ratio of these standard deviations in the two systems.
These ex post diﬀerences raise important practical issues for designers of
retirement systems because they may create an incentive to bail out co-
horts negatively aﬀected by lower stock-return realizations.
Of course, a proper welfare analysis requires the discounting of current
utility over the life cycle. We defer such an analysis to section 11.4 below.
One limitation of the results reported so far is that they counterfactually
predict 100 percent stock market participation among younger investors.
However, we can modify this prediction, with little eﬀect on other aspects
of the model, by adding a ﬁxed cost of stock market participation. Figure
11.6 reports results with a $10,000 ﬁxed cost. The fraction of households
that have paid the ﬁxed cost and the average share of assets invested in
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 455stocks are plotted for each retirement system. Early in life, the two series
move almost perfectly together, showing that young investors are either
entirely in or entirely out of the market; later in life, all investors have paid
the ﬁxed cost, and the model behaves much as it did in the absence of
the cost.
11.3 Heterogeneity
In the previous section, we studied a representative household with a
high school education but no college degree. Results are similar for repre-
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A
B
Fig. 11.5 A, Utility gain; B, Utility dispersion (ratio of standard deviations)sentative households in the other two education groups. However, house-
holds may diﬀer along other dimensions. For example, labor income pro-
cesses may diﬀer for households that work in diﬀerent industries and for
self-employed households. Also, some households may be more impatient
or risk averse than others, as found by Barsky et al. (1997). These diﬀer-
ences across households may have important eﬀects on optimal invest-
ment strategies. In this section, we consider this issue.
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A
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Fig. 11.6 Liquid portfolio share invested in stocks and participation rate: A,
Retirement wealth fully invested in the safe asset and ﬁxed cost of entering in the
stock market; B, Retirement wealth invested 50/50 in risky/safe asset and ﬁxed cost
of entering the stock market11.3.1 Measuring Heterogeneity in Labor Income
We ﬁrst consider variation in the stochastic structure of the labor in-
come process across industries and then study diﬀerences between self-
employed and non-self-employed households.
We use the two-digit SIC classiﬁcation to split households into twelve
diﬀerent industries. Starting in 1972, the PSID reports both the current
industry of the household head if currently working and the last industry
if currently unemployed. This is the information that we use. Three caveats
apply, however. First, we ignore the industry of the spouse. This might be
problematic because the spouse’s labor income is added to the head’s labor
income, yet it might have quite diﬀerent risk characteristics. Second, on
average, 16 percent of our respondents switch industries each year.
Business-cycle considerations (like the anticipation of a recession) might
force people out of cyclic sectors and into less volatile industries. As we
do not model the switching decision, our estimates of the sensitivities of
labor income shocks to ﬁnancial market risks for diﬀerent industries might
be biased. However, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects when we re-
gressed the number of industry switchers onto innovations in business-
cycle indicators. Third, there is a timing issue because the labor income
reported in the PSID is for the previous calendar year while the industry
concerns the current job.
Table 11.2 reports the number of household-year observations for each
of the thirty-six diﬀerent education-industry cells. There is tremendous
variation across industries, with particularly small numbers in mining, per-
Table 11.2 Cell Sizes
No
Industry High School High School College Total
Agriculture 765 1,165 381 2,311
Mining 119 360 98 577
Manufacturing 3,116 7,319 2,430 12,865
Construction 1,414 2,938 494 4,846
Transportation, communications 828 3,172 701 4,701
Trade 1,072 4,661 1,445 7,178
Finance, real estate, insurance 109 995 965 2,069
Business services 439 1,437 548 2,424
Personal services 159 358 108 625
Recreation 39 236 110 385
Professional services 356 1,738 3,883 5,977
Public administration 339 2,357 1,097 3,793
Self-employed 1,115 3,562 2,242 6,919
Non-self-employed 7,640 23,174 10,018 40,832
Total 8,755 26,736 12,260 47,751
458 J. Y. Campbell, J. F. Cocco, F. J. Gomes, and P. J. Maenhoutsonal services, and recreation. These industries are omitted from tables
11.3–11.5 below. As a further cutoﬀ, we drop cells in which any PSID wave
contains fewer than twenty observations; these cells are left blank in tables
11.3–11.5. We do, however, include observations in these small cells when
estimating column and row totals, that is, when reporting the results for a
given industry across all education levels or for a given education group
across all industries.
We reestimate age proﬁles of labor income for the shorter PSID sample
beginning in 1972 and including industry dummies in the vector Zit of
personal characteristics. That is, we allow industry to inﬂuence only the
level and not the shape of the age proﬁle for a household with a given
amount of education. We then estimate the stochastic model of labor in-
come separately for each education-industry cell.3
Table 11.3 reports the total variance of income, and its decomposition
into permanent and transitory components, for each diﬀerent education-
industry cell. Agriculture has by far the highest variance of labor income
shocks. Other industries subject to signiﬁcant labor income shocks are
construction and business services. The variance decomposition indicates
that labor income shocks for construction workers without a high school
degree are entirely temporary. At the other extreme, permanent income
shocks are especially important for college graduates in public administra-
tion. As a general pattern, the relative importance of permanent shocks
seemstoincreasewitheducationattainment.Thiswasalreadydocumented
for the column totals but seems robust within individual industries.
The bottom of table 11.3 splits the sample in a diﬀerent way, by distin-
guishing self-employed from non-self-employed households. (We included
both types of households in the industry analysis since there are too few
self-employed households to allow an industry decomposition.) Income
variability is dramatically larger for self-employed households. Income
shocks are entirely temporary for the self-employed without a high school
degree but are disproportionately permanent for the self-employed in the
two higher education groups.
Table 11.4 considers heterogeneity in the sensitivity of diﬀerent house-
holds’ income shocks to lagged stock returns. Table 11.5 repeats the exer-
cise replacing lagged stock returns with lagged returns on long-term gov-
ernment bonds. Unfortunately, the small cell sizes mean that the results
are often statistically insigniﬁcant for individual industries, but there are
many interesting patterns. Stock market risk seems especially relevant for
peopleinmanufacturing,construction,andpublicadministration.Interest-
rate risk shows up for agriculture, professional services, and ﬁnance, real
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3. We also report results aggregating across industries and education groups. Note that
these diﬀer slightly from the results reported in sec. 11.2 above because, here, our sample


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.estate, and insurance in addition to the stock market-sensitive sectors.
Among college graduates, the self-employed are especially exposed to
stock market risk, while interest-rate risk is far more important for the
non-self-employed. This ﬁnding supports the conclusion of Heaton and
Lucas (2000) that privately owned business risk is an especially impor-
tant substitute for stock market risk in the portfolios of many wealthy
households.
11.3.2 Eﬀects of Heterogeneity on Portfolio Choice
In this section, we illustrate the eﬀects of investor heterogeneity on opti-
mal consumption and portfolio choice. First, we consider heterogeneity of
preferences, calculating optimal behavior for highly risk-averse investors
with 10 and impatient investors with 0.8. Second, we consider
diﬀerences in labor income risk of the sort illustrated in section 11.3.1
above. To highlight these diﬀerences, we simulate the behavior of house-
holds whose income is particularly risky and highly correlated with asset
returns: self-employed college graduates.
Table 11.6 shows average consumption and liquid wealth (in thousands
of dollars) and the share of liquid wealth invested in stocks for diﬀerent
age groups. This is a more compact way for us to summarize the informa-
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Table 11.6 Life-Cycle Proﬁles
Baseline Case 10 0.8 Self-Employed
Age 0/100 50/50a 50/50 0/100 50/50 0/100 50/50 0/100 50/50
Consumption
20–35 20.22 20.26 21.07 20.13 20.88 20.53 20.61 25.09 26.10
36–50 25.48 26.11 26.15 25.12 24.86 26.50 26.47 38.39 38.28
51–65 24.61 26.06 25.46 24.23 24.54 23.94 23.78 35.23 35.35
66–80 22.43 26.64 24.19 22.65 24.46 15.95 15.73 32.67 34.02
81–100 16.98 25.61 18.27 19.04 20.60 14.27 14.27 27.26 28.70
Wealth
20–35 5.94 5.77 6.39 8.20 7.92 3.39 2.73 12.84 13.75
36–50 29.34 23.17 35.87 39.28 50.57 7.25 5.64 65.75 81.99
51–65 75.77 40.34 96.26 100.16 126.78 10.23 7.83 173.70 195.02
66–80 77.28 26.06 92.81 105.50 128.71 5.71 4.71 159.76 169.73
81–100 13.60 4.15 18.40 30.85 39.94 0.11 0.11 46.75 52.00
Liquid portfolio share in stocks
20–35 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.57 0.53
36–50 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.68
51–65 0.88 0.81 0.61 0.61 0.08 1.00 0.90 0.57 0.14
66–80 0.90 0.96 0.85 0.57 0.49 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.51
81–100 0.92 0.58 0.90 0.68 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.53
Tax rates (%)
10.00 10.00 6.00 10.00 6.00 10.00 6.00 10.50 6.75
aRefers to the scenario where the tax rate is held constant at the same level as in the 0/100 case, implying a higher
average replacement ratio.tion presented graphically in ﬁgures 11.2–11.4 above. The ﬁrst three col-
umns of table 11.6 use the baseline parameters and consider retirement
systems with R  0, R  0.5 and the same 10 percent tax rate as with
R  0, and R  0.5 and a lower 6 percent tax rate that maintains the
same average replacement ratio as with R  0.
The next two columns of table 11.6 present results for a higher risk-
aversion coeﬃcient of 10 rather than 5. Since the tax rates do not depend
on , they are the same as in the baseline case. To understand the results
for higher , it is important to remember that, with isoelastic preferences,
this parameter measures both risk aversion and prudence (Kimball 1990).
Greater prudence increases precautionary savings and explains why highly
risk-averse investors consume less, and save more, until age sixty-ﬁve.
After this age, the precautionary savings motive is reduced since there is
no labor income risk and retirement wealth is converted into a riskless
annuity. Thus, highly risk-averse investors consume more after retirement.
Table 11.6 also shows that, as one would expect, highly risk-averse in-
vestors have a lower portfolio share in stocks. One interesting pattern that
is not visible in the table is that, very early in life, these investors’ equity
portfolio share is increasing with age. This pattern does not show up for
investors with 5 because, in early life, these investors are constrained
by their inability to borrow to ﬁnance equity investments. The reason for
this increasing pattern is explained in CGM (1998). In the presence of an
increasing labor income proﬁle, the annuity value of future labor income,
equivalent to implicit holdings of the riskless asset, increases with age at
ﬁrst as peak earnings years move closer in time. Investors respond to this
increase by shifting liquid wealth toward risky ﬁnancial assets. Later on,
the annuity value of future labor income starts to decrease as peak earn-
ings are realized and retirement approaches; investors respond by shifting
out of stocks in middle age.
The next two columns of table 11.6 show optimal consumption, wealth,
and portfolio allocation for impatient households with 0.8. These
households consume more early in life (roughly up to age ﬁfty) and less
later. They accumulate almost no wealth, never holding more than about
$10,000 in liquid assets. What little wealth they do accumulate they hold
in stocks; their exposure to the stock market is so small that they are
extremely tolerant of equity risk.
The last two columns of table 11.6 report results for self-employed
college-educated households.The preference parameters are the same as in
the baseline case, but the results are quite diﬀerent from the ﬁrst three
columns of table 11.6, which apply to households with only a high school
education. The tax rate in the 50/50 system is set to 6.75 percent to main-
tain the average replacement ratio for self-employed college-educated
households. Looking at the share of liquid wealth invested in stocks, there
are two distinctive features: the share invested in risky ﬁnancial assets is
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labor income shocks and the large positive correlation between the latter
and innovations to stock returns crowd out investment in risky ﬁnancial
assets. This eﬀect is particularly strong early in life, when the investor has
accumulated little liquid wealth.
11.4 Welfare Analysis
We have presented detailed results describing the eﬀects of alternative
retirement systems on consumption, wealth accumulation, and portfolio
choice. We now turn to the welfare implications of these systems.
We evaluate each system by discounting current utilities back from the
end to the beginning of adult life (twenty, or twenty-two for college-
educated households). We renormalize discounted utility into consump-
tion-equivalent units so thata5p e r c e n tincrease represents the increase
in utility that would be produced bya5p e r c e n tincrease in consumption
at every date. We calculate the expectation of discounted lifetime utility at
age twenty across all realizations of income and risky-asset returns; in
order to measure the variability of outcomes, we also calculate the stan-
dard deviation of discounted lifetime utility across these realizations. Fi-
nally, we assess welfare eﬀects on retired households by repeating the same
exercise discounting back only to age sixty-ﬁve.
The top panel of table 11.7 reports results for the benchmark case of a
household with risk aversion 5 and a high school education. In the
top row, all retirement wealth is invested in the riskless asset; in the second
row, half of retirement wealth is invested in stocks, but the tax rate is held
constant at 10 percent; in the third row, half of retirement wealth is in-
vested in stocks, and the tax rate is lowered to 6 percent to maintain the
average replacement ratio at 60 percent; and, in the fourth row, all retire-
ment wealth is invested in stocks, and the tax rate is lowered to 3.75 per-
cent to maintain the average replacement ratio. The third and fourth col-
umns give the mean and standard deviation of discounted lifetime utility
in consumption-equivalent units (thousands of dollars of consumption)
at age twenty, the ﬁfth and sixth columns report the same moments at age
sixty-ﬁve, and the remaining columns report the percentage changes in
thesemomentsrelativetothebenchmarkcaseofrisklessretirementwealth.
The table shows that a shift from a riskless retirement system to one
that is 50 percent invested in stocks, with a lower payroll-tax rate, increases
the welfare of the typical twenty-year-old household by 3.7 percent. Most
of the welfare gain is due to the reduction in the tax rate; the household
gains only 0.5 percent if the payroll-tax rate is held constant. The standard
deviation of lifetime utilities across households with diﬀerent income and
asset-return realizations also increases modestly, by 3.4 percent if the
payroll-tax rate is reduced and 2.9 percent if it is held constant.
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their discounted utility is on average 7.8 percent higher if the payroll-tax
rate is reduced and 20.3 percent higher if it is held constant (for then they
have accumulated greater wealth over their working life and at age sixty-
ﬁve are able to enjoy the beneﬁts). A further shift in the retirement system
to 100 percent equity investment, with a payroll-tax rate that is lower
again, produces even larger utility gains but also considerably greater vari-
ability of outcomes.
The next panel of table 11.7 considers a highly risk-averse household
with 10. This household is not usually constrained in its equity hold-
ings under the riskless retirement system, and it actually loses slightly if
the retirement system is shifted into equities without any reduction in the
payroll-tax rate. But, if the payroll-tax rate is reduced, the highly risk-
averse household actually gains more than the benchmark household, 4.4
percent rather than 3.7 percent. The reason is that, under power utility,
higher risk aversion implies a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion—that is, a stronger desire to smooth consumption intertemporally—
and the higher disposable income associated with a lower tax rate allows
the household to smooth consumption more eﬀectively over the life cycle.
Table 11.7 Welfare Analysis
Welfare Welfare Gain Age 20 Gain Age 65
Age 65 Age 20 (%) (%)
Tax Rate
(%) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Baseline:
0/100 10.00 18.67 1.75 22.69 3.42
50/50a 10.00 18.76 1.80 27.30 7.41 0.48 2.86 20.32 116.67
50/50 6.00 19.36 1.81 24.46 6.22 3.70 3.43 7.80 81.87
100/0 3.50 19.59 1.96 24.92 9.77 4.93 12.00 9.83 185.67
10:
0/100 10.00 16.08 2.17 22.53 2.54
50/50a 10.00 16.05 2.19 27.54 6.62 0.18 0.95 22.22 160.81
50/50 6.00 16.78 2.26 24.42 5.68 4.35 4.15 8.39 123.62
2:
0/100 10.00 20.71 1.17 22.03 3.27
50/50a 10.00 21.18 1.30 29.86 8.57 2.31 11.15 35.57 161.92
50/50 6.00 21.50 1.33 23.11 6.25 3.83 13.79 4.91 90.94
Welfare Gain
Age 22 Age 22
College-educated
self-employed:
0/100 10.50 17.64 2.90 31.20 5.09
50/50a 10.50 17.63 2.89 37.96 10.13 0.07 0.36 21.66 99.11
50/50 6.75 18.31 2.95 32.83 7.79 3.80 1.72 5.22 53.05
aRefers to the scenario where the tax rate is held constant at the same level as in the 0/100 case, implying a higher
average replacement ratio.
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household with 2. The results here are the mirror image of those for
the highly risk-averse household. The risk-tolerant household gains more
than the benchmark household if the payroll-tax rate is ﬁxed (for it is
particularly anxious to relax constraints on its equity holdings) but gains
less if the payroll-tax rate is reduced (since improved opportunities to
smooth consumption over the life cycle are less important for this house-
hold).
The last panel of table 11.7 reports results for a household headed by a
self-employed college graduate. This household has risky labor income
that is unusually correlated with the stock market, so its desired stockhold-
ings are smaller than those of the benchmark household; it actually loses
slightly from the investment of retirement wealth in equities with a ﬁxed
tax rate. On the other hand, this household also has a particularly pro-
nounced hump shape in labor income, so it is particularly anxious to
smooth consumption over the life cycle. The household gains 3.8 percent
from a risky retirement system with a lower payroll-tax rate, comparable
to the results for the benchmark household.
All the results in table 11.7 can be criticized on the grounds that they
are derived from a model in which there is no role for a social security
system. Since households save and invest their liquid wealth optimally, the
mandatory saving and rigid asset allocation of the retirement system can
only reduce their welfare. In this setting, any reform that eﬀectively re-
duces the scale of social security will increase welfare.
As a partial response to this concern, in table 11.8 we report a “paternal-
istic” welfare analysis in which the government uses diﬀerent utility pa-
rameters than those of the household itself. In the ﬁrst panel, the house-
hold is impatient, with 0.8; left to its own devices, it will do very little
saving for retirement, as illustrated in table 11.6 above. The government,
however, discounts utility using 0.96, as in our benchmark case. Here,
there is a modest welfare gain of 2.0 percent from a shift of retirement
wealth toward equities with a ﬁxed tax rate but a small welfare loss of
0.6 percent if the payroll-tax rate is reduced. The reason, of course, is
that, from the government’s point of view, people make poor use of their
tax cuts, spending them early in life and failing to save enough for re-
tirement.
The second panel of table 11.8 reports results when the household is
highly risk averse, with 10, but the government is risk tolerant, with
2. In this case, a shift of retirement wealth toward equities forces
households to take on more risk, which improves their welfare from the
government’s point of view. Welfare rises by 1.7 and 2.4 percent, respec-
tively, in the cases with ﬁxed and reduced payroll-tax rates.
All the results that we have reported so far assume that the riskless real
interest rate is ﬁxed at 2 percent and the equity premium at 4 percent. As
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This is a valuable check on the robustness of our basic results; it also
enables us to consider what might happen to welfare if the investment of
retirement wealth in risky assets reduced the equilibrium equity premium.
The top panel of table 11.9 repeats the ﬁrst three rows of table 11.7 for
the benchmark case. The second and third panels consider two alternative
scenarios in which the equity premium is 1 percentage point lower at 3
percent. In the ﬁrst alternative, the equity premium falls, but the riskless
interest rate is unchanged, so the expected equity return falls by 1 percent-
age point. This is a scenario envisaged by critics of social security invest-
ment in equities who worry that such a reform would drive up stock prices
and drive down expected stock returns. In the second alternative, the eq-
uity premium falls, but the riskless interest rate rises by 1 percentage point,
leaving the expected equity return unchanged. This scenario is predicted
by general equilibrium models in which the return to risky capital is ﬁxed
by technology, such as Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) or Abel (chap. 5
in this volume).
Within each of the alternative scenarios, the welfare gains produced by
risky investment of retirement wealth are similar to but slightly smaller
than those in the benchmark case. In rows 6, 8, 11, and 13, table 11.9
compares welfare in the alternative scenarios with risky investment of re-
tirement wealth to welfare in the benchmark case with riskless investment
of retirement wealth. This is a crude way to capture the possibility that
risky investment of retirement wealth might lower the equity premium. It
turns out that the results are critically dependent on the way in which the
equity premium falls. If it falls through lower stock returns, as in the ﬁrst
alternative, then welfare gains are reduced from 3.7 to 2.8 percent. If it
falls through a higher riskless rate, as in the second alternative, then wel-
fare gains are actually increased to 5.0 percent.
Table 11.8 Paternalistic Welfare Analysis
Welfare Welfare Gain Age 20 Gain Age 65
(%) Age 20 (%) Age 65
Tax Rate
(%) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
 too low:
0/100 10.00 18.13 1.64 17.26 1.31
50/50a 10.00 18.50 1.77 25.33 8.05 2.04 7.93 46.76 514.50
50/50 6.00 18.03 1.62 17.03 1.20 0.55 1.22 1.33 8.40
 too high:
0/100 10.00 20.67 1.09 20.26 2.75
50/50a 10.00 21.02 1.22 30.59 7.34 1.69 12.12 50.96 166.82
50/50 6.00 21.17 1.21 27.39 6.24 2.42 11.01 35.19 126.91
aRefers to the scenario where the tax rate is held constant at the same level as in the 0/100 case, implying a higher
average replacement ratio.
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Decisions about the quantity and form of retirement saving are among
the most important that a typical household takes in the course of a life-
time. Despite the importance of the issue, until very recently ﬁnancial
economists have had little quantitative understanding of the factors that
should aﬀect this decision. This gap in our knowledge has made it hard
to give sound advice to policy makers considering reforms in retirement
systems.
In this paper, we have built a partial equilibrium life-cycle model that
can be used to explore the properties of alternative systems. In our bench-
mark case, we ﬁnd a welfare gain equivalent to 3.7 percent of consumption
from the investment of half of retirement wealth into equities, accompa-
nied by a reduction in the social security tax rate to maintain the same
average replacement rate of income in retirement. The main channel
through which these gains are realized is that a lower social security tax
rate helps households smooth their consumption over the life cycle. The
gains from equity investment of retirement wealth are smaller, about 0.5
Table 11.9 Welfare Analysis with Alternative Mean Asset Returns
Welfare Welfare Gain Age 20 Gain Age 65
Age 65 Age 20 (%) (%)
Tax Rate




0/100 10.00 18.67 1.75 22.69 3.42
50/50a 10.00 18.76 1.80 27.30 7.41 0.48 2.86 20.32 116.67




0/100 10.00 18.57 1.70 22.15 3.53
50/50a 10.00 18.63 1.78 25.13 6.64 0.33 4.43 13.48 87.89
b 0.22 1.73 10.75 94.05
50/50 7.25 19.20 1.82 25.49 6.74 3.38 6.69 15.11 90.74




0/100 7.00 19.30 1.79 24.20 4.16
50/50a 7.00 19.32 1.84 26.76 6.88 0.12 2.81 10.60 65.38
b 3.50 5.16 17.96 101.16
50/50 4.75 19.61 1.83 25.07 6.11 1.61 2.23 3.60 46.88
b 5.03 4.57 10.49 78.65
aRefers to the scenario where the tax rate is held constant at the same level as in the 0/100 case, implying a higher
average replacement ratio.
bComputes the welfare gain relative to the baseline case, i.e., under the initial assumption for asset returns of 	
4% and RF  1.02.
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 469percent of consumption, when the social security tax rate is held constant
at its initial level. Interestingly, in our model, particularly risk-averse
households are particularly keen to smooth consumption and thus experi-
ence even larger gains from reduced tax rates made possible by equity
returns on retirement wealth. This is true despite the fact that risk-averse
households are less enthusiastic equity investors.
While these results are encouraging for proponents of equity investment
by the social security system, we note two caveats. First, lower social se-
curity tax rates reduce welfare by 0.6 percent of consumption in a model
in which investors are extremely impatient, with a low time-discount fac-
tor of 0.8, but the government judges their welfare using a higher time-
discount factor of 0.96. This calculation is a crude way to capture factors
that might lead to inadequate private saving and justify a mandatory
retirement-saving system. In this model, however, there is a substantial
gain of 2.0 percent from social security equity investment with ﬁxed tax
rates. These ﬁndings suggest that the appropriate adjustment of tax rates
will depend on detailed assumptions about the behavior of households but
that, under a wide range of assumptions, there are welfare gains to be had
by investing some retirement wealth into equities.
Second, a system with partial investment of retirement wealth in the
equity market has greater variability of outcomes across cohorts. Particu-
larly negative outcomes for some cohorts might provoke pressure for polit-
ical bailouts, and the anticipation of bailouts might change the consump-
tion behavior modeled here. This is an important issue for research on
social security reform.
Using data from the PSID, we study heterogeneity in labor income pro-
cesses across households. We ﬁnd that some households—particularly
self-employed college graduates—are exposed to much greater volatility
in their labor income than are typical households. The labor income of
these households also tends to be more highly correlated with returns on
stocks and long-term bonds. This heterogeneity aﬀects optimal investment
strategies and may help justify social security reform that includes an ele-
ment of personal choice.
We also consider the possibility that the investment of retirement wealth
in equities might reduce the equity premium. We do not build a general
equilibrium model to study this issue, but we do compare results under
alternative assumptions about the equity premium. We ﬁnd that it matters
greatly whether the equity premium falls through a decline in the expected
return on stocks or through a rise in the riskless interest rate. In the former
case, the welfare gains from investing retirement wealth in equities are
reduced, while, in the latter case, they are actually greater than in our
benchmark model.
In evaluating our results, it is important to be aware of several respects
in which our model is oversimpliﬁed. First, we consider only self-ﬁnancing
470 J. Y. Campbell, J. F. Cocco, F. J. Gomes, and P. J. Maenhoutretirement systems in which there is no net payment from any household
to any other. Thus, we ignore the redistributive features of the present
social security system, and we have nothing to say about the overhang of
liabilities to previous generations implied by the present system. Second,
we assume that asset returns are independently and identically distributed.
Thus, we ignore the variation in real interest rates and equity premia that
is the subject of much recent research. Third, we abstract from the exis-
tence of owner-occupied housing. This is an important omission since
housing is the main component of wealth for many people. Cocco (1998)
takes a ﬁrst step toward the realistic incorporation of housing into a life-
cycle model. Fourth, we assume that labor income shocks have constant
variances. Some researchers have argued that the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks to labor income is higher when the economy is weak and risky-
asset returns are low; this can have important eﬀects on the demand for
risky assets, as shown by Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Duﬃe
(1996), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1998). Finally, we assume
that labor income and the retirement age are exogenous to the household.
Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1991) point out that households with
ﬂexible labor supply can aﬀord to hold riskier portfolios because they can
adjust to negative asset returns both by changing their consumption and
by changing their labor supply. An important task for future research is
to incorporate these and other realistic complications into the basic life-
cycle model of portfolio choice.
References
Abel, Andrew B. 1998. The aggregate eﬀects of including equities in the social
security trust fund. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Typescript.
Attanasio, Orazio. 1995. The intertemporal allocation of consumption: Theory
and evidence. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 42:39–89.
Balduzzi, Perluigi, and Anthony Lynch. 1999. Transaction costs and predict-
ability: Some utility cost calculations. Journal of Financial Economics 52:
47–78.
Barberis, Nicholas C. 2000. How big are hedging demands? Evidence from long-
horizon asset allocation. Journal of Finance 55 (February): 225–64.
Barsky, Robert B., F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball, and Matthew D. Shapiro.
1997. Preference parameters and behavioral heterogeneity: An experimental ap-
proach in the Health and Retirement Study. Quarterly Journal of Economics
112:537–79.
Bertaut, Carol C., and Michael Haliassos. 1997. Precautionary portfolio behavior
from a life-cycle perspective. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21:
1511–42.
Blanchard, Olivier J. 1993. Movements in the equity premium. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, no. 2:75–118.
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 471Bodie, Zvi, Robert C. Merton, and William Samuelson. 1991. Labor supply ﬂexi-
bility and portfolio choice in a life cycle model. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 16:427–49.
Brandt, Michael W. 1999. Estimating portfolio and consumption choice: A condi-
tional Euler equations approach. Journal of Finance 54 (October): 1609–45.
Brennan, Michael J., Eduardo S. Schwartz, and Ronald Lagnado. 1997. Strategic
asset allocation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21:1377–1403.
Brennan, Michael J., and Y. Xia. 1998. Resolution of a ﬁnancial puzzle. Anderson
Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles. Type-
script.
Campbell, John Y. 1996. Understanding risk and return. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 104:298–345.
Campbell, John Y., and N. Gregory Mankiw. 1989. Consumption, income, and
interest rates: Reinterpreting the time series evidence. In NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, ed. Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, 185–216. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press.
Campbell, John Y., and Robert J. Shiller. 1998. Valuation ratios and the long-run
stock market outlook. Journal of Portfolio Management 24:11–26.
Campbell, John Y., and Luis M. Viceira. 1999. Consumption and portfolio deci-
sions when expected returns are time varying. Quarterly Journal of Economics
114:433–95.
———. In press. Who should buy long-term bonds? American Economic Review.
Carroll, Christopher D., and Andrew A. Samwick. 1997. The nature of precau-
tionary wealth. Journal of Monetary Economics 40 (September): 41–71.
Carroll, Christopher D., and Lawrence H. Summers. 1991. Consumption growth
parallels income growth: Some new evidence. In National savings and economic
performance, ed. B. D. Bernheim and John B. Shoven. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Cocco, Joa ˜o F. 1998. Owner-occupied housing, permanent income, and portfolio
choice. Harvard University. Typescript.
Cocco, Joa ˜o F., Francisco J. Gomes, and Pascal J. Maenhout. 1998. Consumption
and portfolio choice over the life-cycle. Harvard University. Typescript.
Constantinides, George M., John B. Donaldson, and Rajnish Mehra. 1998. Junior
can’t borrow: A new perspective on the equity premium puzzle. NBER Working
Paper no. 6617. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Constantinides, George M., and Darrell Duﬃe. 1996. Asset pricing with heteroge-
neous consumers. Journal of Political Economy 104:219–40.
Cox, John, Jonathan E. Ingersoll Jr., and Stephen A. Ross. 1985. A theory of the
term structure of interest rates. Econometrica 53:385–408.
Deaton, Angus S. 1991. Savings and liquidity constraints. Econometrica 59:
1221–48.
Fama, Eugene F., and G. William Schwert. 1977. Human capital and capital mar-
ket equilibrium. Journal of Financial Economics 5:115–46.
Gakidis, Harry. 1997. Earnings uncertainty and life-cycle portfolio choice. Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. Typescript.
Geanakoplos, John, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Stephen P. Zeldes. 1999. Social security
money’s worth. In Prospects for social security reform, ed. Olivia S. Mitchell,
Robert J. Myers, and Howard Young. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Jonathan Parker. 1996. Consumption over the life
cycle. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Typescript.
472 J. Y. Campbell, J. F. Cocco, F. J. Gomes, and P. J. MaenhoutHeaton, John, and Deborah J. Lucas. 1997. Market frictions, saving behavior, and
portfolio choice. Macroeconomic Dynamics 1:76–101.
———. 2000. Portfolio choice and asset prices: The importance of entrepreneurial
risk. Journal of Finance 55:1163–98.
Hubbard, Glenn, Jonathan S. Skinner, and Stephen Zeldes. 1994. The importance
of precautionary motives for explaining individual and aggregate saving. Carne-
gie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 40:59–125.
Jagannathan, Ravi, and Zhenyu Wang. 1996. The conditional CAPM and the cross
section of expected returns. Journal of Finance 51:3–53.
Kim, Tong Suk, and Edward Omberg. 1996. Dynamic nonmyopic portfolio behav-
ior. Review of Financial Studies 9:141–61.
Kimball, Miles. 1990. Precautionary saving in the small and in the large. Econo-
metrica 58:53–73.
Liu, Jun. 1998. Portfolio selection in stochastic environments. Stanford Univer-
sity. Typescript.
Mankiw, N. Gregory. 1986. The equity premium and the concentration of aggre-
gate shocks. Journal of Financial Economics 17:211–19.
Merton, Robert C. 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: The con-
tinuous time case. Review of Economics and Statistics 51:247–57.
———. 1971. Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time
model. Journal of Economic Theory 3:373–413.
Pischke, Jo ¨rn-Steﬀen. 1995. Individual income, incomplete information, and ag-
gregate consumption. Econometrica 63:805–40.
Poterba, James M., and Andrew A. Samwick. 1997. Household portfolio allo-
cation over the life cycle. NBER Working Paper no. 6185. Cambridge, Mass.:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ross, Stephen A. 1999. Samuelson’s fallacy of large numbers revisited. Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. Typescript.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection by dynamic stochastic pro-
gramming. Review of Economics and Statistics 51:239–46.
———. 1991. Long-run risk tolerance when equity returns are mean regressing:
Pseudoparadoxes and vindication of a “Businessman’s Risk.” In Money, macro-
economics, and economic policy: Essays in honor of James Tobin, ed. William
C. Brainard, William D. Nordhaus, and Harold W. Watts. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press.
Storesletten, Kjetil, Chris I. Telmer, and Amir Yaron. 1998. Asset pricing with
idiosyncratic risk and overlapping generations. Carnegie-Mellon University.
Typescript.
———. 1999. The risk sharing implications of alternative social security arrange-
ments. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 50:213–59.
Tauchen, George, and R. Hussey. 1991. Quadrature-based methods for obtaining
approximate solutions to nonlinear asset pricing models. Econometrica 59:
371–96.
Viceira, Luis M. In press. Optimal portfolio choice for long-horizon investors with
nontradable income. Journal of Finance.
Wachter, Jessica. 1998a. Portfolio and consumption decisions under mean-
reverting returns: An exact solution for complete markets. Harvard University.
Typescript.
———. 1998b. Risk aversion and allocation to long-term bonds. Harvard Univer-
sity. Typescript.
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 473Comment Amir Yaron
The goal of “Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model” by
John Y.Campbell, Joa ˜o F.Cocco, Francisco J.Gomes, and PascalJ. Maen-
hout is to analyze quantitatively the eﬀects that diﬀerent mandatory retire-
ment plans have on savings, portfolio choice, and welfare. Campbell et al.’s
analysis concentrates on retirement accounts that are based on a deﬁned-
contribution system. They ask what the ramiﬁcations are of investing at
least part of the retirement account in equity, relative to investing it com-
pletely in risk-free bonds. Their analysis is motivated by the recent evi-
dence on the projected decline in implicit rates of return on investments in
social security and notable plans to alleviate these problems by privatizing
components of social security or by investing part of the social security
trust fund in equities (see Advisory Council on Social Security 1996).
Both plans rely on the historically higher rates of return that stocks have
yielded over Treasury bills—the “equity premium.”
It should be clear that, absent any frictions, changes in the investment
proﬁle of a deﬁned-contribution retirement account will be completely
neutralized by agents’ adjustments to the portfolio of their private savings.
In the light of this, Campbell et al. go to great lengths to specify a rich
labor supply process and various borrowing and stock market participa-
tion constraints. It is the interaction among these factors that governs the
quantitative changes in optimal portfolio allocations and hence any
changes in savings and welfare.
My analysis of the paper starts by summarizing Campbell et al.’s main
ﬁndings. I then proceed to analyze, within a two-period model, the eﬀects
that borrowing constraints and ﬁxed costs of entering into the stock mar-
ket have on portfolio allocations—and point toward the factors that I
believe yield the results that the authors obtain. The last part discusses
some outstanding issues regarding their analysis.
Campbell et al.’s main results can be summarized as follows: (1) When
ﬁxed costs are not present, they ﬁnd that most young agents hold 100
percent stocks. (2) Once ﬁxed costs are introduced, most agents partici-
pate in the stock market by the age of thirty. (3) The responses of portfolio
allocations are qualitatively similar to the case when there are no ﬁxed
costs. They ﬁnd substantial welfare gains, on the order of 3.7–4.9 percent
of annual consumption, when half of retirement savings is invested in eq-
uity and taxes are adjusted to equate replacement ratios at retirement.
(4) Most of the welfare gains are due to the income eﬀect and inﬂuence
mainly the young. (5) They ﬁnd evidence for signiﬁcant diﬀerences in in-
come processes across occupations and industrial sectors—a feature that
alters agents’ portfolio choice.
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There are three factors that play a key role in Campbell et al.’s frame-
work. The ﬁrst two are borrowing constraints and ﬁxed costs preventing
agents from participating in the stock market. The third factor is the labor
income proﬁle that agents face. I ﬁnd it useful to start by analyzing the
implications of the borrowing and ﬁxed-cost constraints within a simpli-
ﬁed two-period life-cycle model. To do this, it is instructive to think of an
environment where an agent maximizes expected utility over two periods
by choosing the ﬁrst-period rate of savings, ), out of disposable wealth,
W  T, and the proportion of savings invested in equity, L. The propor-
tion of the retirement account that is invested in equity, R, is not under
the agent’s control. The retirement account is ﬁnanced by the tax collected
in the ﬁrst period, T. Formally, agents face the following problem:
max ( ) ( )
{, } )
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The issues with which Campbell et al. are concerned can now be cast in
terms of this framework. They ask in a more realistic life-cycle setup, How
do ) and L change with age? How do ) and L respond to an increase
in R?
Campbell et al.’s setup is geared toward getting realistic age proﬁles for
) and L in the base case when the retirement accounts are fully invested
in risk-free bonds. Table 11C.1 summarizes the changes in ﬁrst-period
consumption,  )(W  T), and the share invested in equity in the liquid
investment account, L, in response to an increase in the equity share of
the retirement account—namely,  R  0.
The ﬁrst entry in table 11C.1, the northwestern quadrant, when there
are no borrowing constraints and no ﬁxed costs is the complete frictionless
Table 11C.1 Response to R  0( T  0,  savings  C  [W  T])
No Fixed Costs Binding Fixed Costs
No borrowing constraints  C  0  C  0
 L  0  L  0
Binding borrowing constraints  C  0  C  0
 L  0  L  0
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 475environment mentioned earlier. In this situation, agents undo the govern-
ment’s increased investment in equity in the retirement account. Hence,
the amount invested in equity in the private liquid account must decline
to ensure that the overall investment in risky equity out of total wealth is
unchanged. Consequently, there are no changes in consumption and
savings.
The southeastern block in table 11C.1 describes the situation in which
agents both are constrained from borrowing and are facing binding ﬁxed
costs preventing entry into the stock market. In this case, a one-dollar
switch into equity in the retirement account increases second-period in-
come by E(R)  Rf—the “equity premium.” Agents then desire to borrow
and invest in stocks even more. However, as long as the stock market
participation costs and borrowing constraints are still binding, agents are
constrained at zero bond- and stockholdings in the liquid savings account
(BL  SL  0). As a consequence, agents cannot change their ﬁrst-period
consumption or savings.
The northeastern block of table 11C.1 describes the situation in which
agents are not constrained from borrowing but are facing ﬁxed costs that
prevent them from entering the stock market. Again, agents beneﬁt from
the “equity premium,” namely, for each dollar invested in the retirement
account, they now receive an extra E(R)  Rf dollars in the second period.
The fact that agents are constrained from investing in the stock market
implies that, had this constraint not existed, they would save more by in-
vesting part of ﬁrst-period wealth in equity. Agents do not choose to in-
crease their bondholdings (and hence save more) because they were al-
ready at their constrained optimum before the change in the retirement
portfolio. Therefore, the best that agents can do is to smooth consumption
by increasing consumption in the ﬁrst period. Hence, savings are reduced.
Finally, the southwestern block of the table describes the case where
there are no ﬁxed costs but the borrowing constraints are binding. In this
case, once retirement accounts are invested in equity, agents can poten-
tially reduce their increased second-period income by divesting away from
equity. The fact that the borrowing constraint is binding implies that
agents still prefer to buy more stocks but are constrained from doing so
by the borrowing constraint. In the light of the increased income in the
second period, and in order to smooth consumption, agents choose to
increase consumption during the ﬁrst period and continue to allocate 100
percent of their private savings to stocks.
The analysis presented above indicates that an increase in the share in-
vested in equity in the retirement portfolio (i.e., a rise in R) should lead
to a reduction in overall savings and a reduction in the share invested in
equity in the private liquid accounts. This is true as long as there is some
mass of agents who are completely unconstrained (the northwestern quad-
rant) and some others who are facing binding borrowing constraints but
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southwestern and northeastern quadrants, respectively). Campbell et al.
obtain, however, a signiﬁcant increase in overall savings (see their ﬁg. 11.2
or ﬁg. 11C.1 below) and relatively small changes in the share invested in
equity in the liquid savings accounts. The key reason that Campbell et al.
ﬁnd an increase in savings, as opposed to what the simple model presented
above suggests, is the stage in the life cycle in which the increased “equity-
premium” income is received. In the analysis presented above, the beneﬁts
from investing in equity accrue during the second period—the retirement
stage. On the other hand, Campbell et al. choose to ﬁx the level of retire-
ment beneﬁts across the diﬀerent investment experiments. With an in-
creased equity share in the retirement accounts, lower taxes need to be
levied in order to reach the level of retirement beneﬁts available before. In
the notation used above, this implies a smaller T—that is, Campbell et al.
deliver the beneﬁts during the ﬁrst period. Receiving the beneﬁts in the
ﬁrst period of life allows for a few eﬀects. First, some agents may now be
able to enter the stock market, whereas before they were constrained from
doing so. Second, because agents now have relatively more income in the
ﬁrst period, they will save more during the ﬁrst period in order to smooth
consumption. This is the main channel that leads to the increase in savings
that Campbell et al. ﬁnd.
Another factor aﬀecting Campbell et al.’s analysis that is absent in the
simple two-period model presented above is the fact that labor income is
stochastic and has a deterministic hump-shape component. As can be seen
in ﬁgures 11.2 and 11.3, consumption tracks income very closely in the
very early stages of life. The increased income, discussed above, translates
almost entirely into an increase in consumption in those highly con-
strained early stages of life and only later to a rise in savings. The increase
in utility shows up in terms of larger consumption during these ﬁrst years
of the life cycle. In summary, welfare, savings, and portfolio choice are
quite sensitive to whether the beneﬁts from the “equity premium” are
given in the form of increased beneﬁts at retirement or in the form of lower
taxes during the working years. Abel (chap. 5 in this volume) makes simi-
lar arguments for explaining the diﬀerent results that he gets concerning
capital accumulations when he analyzes a deﬁned-beneﬁt and a deﬁned-
contribution system.
It would be interesting to get a quantitative feel for how much the wel-
fare gains Campbell et al. report really depend on the variation in life-
cycle labor income processes relative to the alleviation of the borrowing
constraint. In ﬁgure 11C.1, I plot the combined investment in risky equity
both in the liquid and in the retirement account relative to total wealth in
both accounts. Namely, I plot   (SL  SR)/(WR  WL). Two key fea-
tures emerge from this ﬁgure. First, in both cases, , the fraction invested
in equity as a fraction of total wealth, tends not to move as much over the
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 477life cycle as L (see Campbell et al.’s ﬁg. 11.4). This is of course partly due
to the fact that the denominator is now much larger as it includes both
retirement and liquid wealth and to the fact that L oﬀsets to some degree
some of the changes in R. The second key observation is that  shifts up
in almost parallel fashion once retirement accounts are invested in equity.
As mentioned earlier, since agents like to be at 100 percent stocks or very
close to it, investing in equity through the retirement account alleviates
this constraint and allows agents to get closer to their unconstrained de-
sired portfolio position. It seems that relaxing the borrowing constraint is
the dominating factor for the welfare gains that Campbell et al. ﬁnd while
the speciﬁc variations in the labor income process are of secondary impor-
tance.
Welfare Gains—Other Factors
The welfare gains that Campbell et al. ﬁnd are large. In the light of this,
it is important to consider what factors might alter these welfare gains.
Campbell et al. analyze a deﬁned-contribution system. In a deﬁned-beneﬁt
system, as in the current social security system, there are important non-
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Fig. 11C.1 Portfolioshareofstocksoutoftotalwealth:(SLSR)/(WRWL)
Note:  is based on ﬁgs. 11.2 and 11.3 in Campbell et al. and on linearly extrapolating income
in between ﬁve years. The dotted line shows share out of just ﬁnancial wealth, and the solid
line shows total wealth.linearities in the beneﬁts formula. First, there is cap for contributions to
social security. This implies that wealthy agents are not as negatively
aﬀected by having retirement accounts being invested in bonds since their
mandatory retirement account is a relatively small portion of their overall
retirement plans. Second, social security currently provides a minimum
level of beneﬁts. For the very poor, having such a ﬂoor level of beneﬁts
may be more attractive than the gain from investing their very low level of
wealth in equities. Both these factors make me think that, had the authors
analyzed a system that is closer to the current one, the welfare gains would
be much smaller.
A second important factor that may aﬀect welfare gains, which Camp-
bell et al. acknowledge is absent from their framework, is an account of
the transition or debt that would be required in moving from the current
system to the one that they in fact analyze. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(1999) show that accounting for the debt that would need to be raised in
order to keep up promises to the old is crucial in evaluating welfare gains
across alternative social security plans. They show that accounting for the
debt burden to the old can cut the welfare gains in half.
Finally, much of the discussion on restructuring social security deals
with whether to invest the trust fund in equity or to allow a component
of social security to be privatized in a similar fashion to the deﬁned-
contribution framework analyzed by Campbell et al. One beneﬁt of the
current social security system is its implicit longevity insurance through
the annuity provisions that it provides. A crucial aspect of Campbell et
al.’s analysis is the fact that, even when the system becomes more privat-
ized, these actuarially fair annuities will be available. There is a long litera-
ture documenting how private retirement annuities are far from being
fairly priced (see Friedman and Warshawsky 1990). If uninsurable labor
income is an important component of overall income, as is the case in
Campbell et al.’s analysis, the availability of annuities will crucially aﬀect
agents’ savings. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999) show that, in a
general equilibrium framework, the availability of annuities is quantita-
tively important in comparing alternatives to social security. Hence, a fully
privatized deﬁned-contribution system, in which agents need to acquire
retirement annuities privately, will not provide as much mortality insur-
ance as the current system as long as private annuity markets are still not
completely actuarially fair.
In summary, Campbell et al. provide a rich framework for evaluating
the welfare beneﬁts of increasing the equity share of investments in a de-
ﬁned-contribution retirement system. Their analysis provides interesting
information about the channels and magnitude by which welfare is in-
creased. A natural next step would be to account for some of the issues
mentioned above and reevaluate their results in a general equilibrium
framework.
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Discussion Summary
James Poterba noted that the young participate very quickly in equity mar-
kets in this model. He conjectured that including housing in the analysis
would probably eliminate this counterfactual prediction by eﬀectively
shortening the horizon of the young. He suggested examining this nontriv-
ial extension of an already quite involved model in another paper. In such
an extended model, a tax cut resulting from social security reform will
allow young agents to accumulate wealth faster toward a downpayment.
This would be an additional source of welfare gains.
Antonio Rangel remarked that, although the model does not assign an
explicit role to the government, it could be used to answer an intriguing
question, namely, What is the value of relaxing constraints? Rangel envi-
sioned an analysis of the value of being able to buy some of the labor
income of the next cohort, both in environments with and in those without
constraints, with a subsequent comparison.
Robert Shiller remarked that the authors are probably overestimating
the amount of heterogeneity in the PSID data set, for a number of reasons.
First, the data are self-reported and therefore likely subject to measure-
ment error. Second, a lot of income changes are essentially job changes,
deliberately chosen by agents, rather than exogenous shocks hitting them.
For instance, people might move to another city with a higher cost of
living and therefore change jobs. Similarly, they might work overtime tem-
porarily because of liquidity constraints due to the purchase of a house or
drop out of the labor force for family reasons. Shiller concluded that, while
the model does not include these changes in the information sets of agents,
in fact they often are important.
Andrew Samwick wondered what could be the reason for the low degree
of stock market participation observed among the young as opposed to
the high demand for stocks predicted by the model. A ﬁrst—but minor—
reason could be that young households are not the natural tax clientele
simply by having low income. Samwick conjectured that a more important
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a small buﬀer stock early in life, as opposed to what is found in the model
assuming a relatively low discount rate.
Henning Bohn commented on the idea of making the payroll tax age
dependent. Although this seems natural to consider in a model with li-
quidity constraints early in life, it might be less so in the context of the
current system with redistributional components for strategic reasons.
What makes the current system viable, according to a vast literature, is
that the very young taxpayers making contributions constitute only a
small minority. In addition, older taxpayers already have substantial re-
sources sunk into the system by the time they become the median-age
voter and have a vested interest in preserving the system. Lowering payroll
taxes for the young could erode the support for the current system.
Robert King wanted to follow up on Bohn, but from a diﬀerent perspec-
tive. An interesting result of the paper is that individuals are quite likely
to be constrained during the ﬁrst ten years of the life cycle. Baxter and
King (chap. 10 in this volume) did similar simulations in the absence of
any asset-allocation choice and obtained the same results, independent of
preferences or of the annuity structure. They conducted a welfare analysis
very much like the one Campbell et al. report and also obtained consider-
able welfare gains associated with relaxing those constraints. King con-
cluded that this may well be one of the central insights of this paper and
of this project. Practically, it would suggest that the U.S. system should
be changed to allow individuals to postpone paying contributions until
later in life, rather than to start contributing in the earliest, liquidity-
constrained years.
Martin Feldstein remarked in response that anything that lowers the tax
rate in equilibrium will have that eﬀect and reduce the burden on the
young. Amir Yaron concurred but noted that changing the timing of the
contributions in an age-dependent way, as suggested by King, would be a
more direct approach.
First, with respect to including housing into the analysis, John Campbell
agreed that this would be an important extension of the model. He noted
that one of the authors, Joa ˜o Cocco, has done work on this (see Cocco
1999). The eﬀects of housing on portfolio choice are not straightforward
and are more complex than would be anticipated. For one thing, it might
actually increase risk taking by the young, and hence the demand for
stocks, as owner-occupied housing, providing consumption services,
might act as a consumption ﬂoor. Francisco Gomes also referred in this
context to empirical work by Heaton and Lucas (1997) on the relation
between mortgages and portfolio composition.
With respect to Samwick’s comment that the high demand for stocks
by the young might be due to the low discount rate assumed, Campbell
Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model 481remarked that the results are quite robust to changes in this parameter.
Previous work considered a rate of time preference of 0.10 and obtained
similar results. Pascal Maenhout noted that Gakidis (1997) assumes an
extreme discount rate of 0.40 in order to match the data in a calibration
exercise using the method of simulated moments.
Regarding the discussion of the optimality of age-dependent tax rates,
Gomes agreed that this was an important prediction of the model.
Allowing the young to consume more leads to substantial welfare gains.
Finally, Campbell agreed with Shiller on the issue of overstating the
amount of heterogeneity but noted that many other papers in a large liter-
ature follow a similar procedure and are thus subject to the same criticism.
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